Compromise on the Horizon?

Boehner and McConnell are talking optimistically about a compromise. Ed Morrissey suggests one possible shakeout:

My prediction is that we will see a deal structured in two installments of the debt-ceiling hike using the McConnell mechanism, which combined will hit the amount Reid wanted, and with the cuts and assumptions built into the Boehner proposal (with possibly a few changes, which should be checked), with a commitment for a balanced-budget amendment vote in the Senate included.

What Kind of Compromise?

The Boehner bill has failed in the Senate. The Reid bill will fail in the House. Right now, Republicans and Democrats are negotiating to forge some kind of consensus for a bill that could pass the Senate and the House.

These, it seems to me, are the big points of contention:

• How big a raise in the debt ceiling? How many steps? Boehner's committed to a two-step process, in which an immediate increase in the debt ceiling would be followed by another vote in 6 or so months that would require the passage of a Balanced Budget Amendment. Reid's bill would offer enough of an increase to carry the debt past 2012.




• Role of a Balanced Budget Amendment? Boehner requires Congressional passage of one before a "second tranche"; Reid doesn't.




• Where are the cuts? How frontloaded are they? This is perhaps the most flexible and opaque part of discussion (as projected saving/spending often is).




• Power of appointed committee? Both proposals would have expedited review, but Boehner's proposal demands a certain threshold of savings before the passage of the "second tranche."

The exact placement of cuts is perhaps where Republicans can demand the most (because they might have to give elsewhere), especially in their insistence that they be more front-loaded and substantive.

I'm doubtful that Republican leadership (especially Boehner and McConnell) really want to see the debt-ceiling battle redux, so both Republicans and Democrats might have something to gain by avoiding a "second tranche" two-step. Both parties could split the difference perhaps by not allowing a second increase in the debt ceiling to take place without a vote on the recommendations of the savings committee; once the vote took place (yea or nay), the ceiling could be raised. Yes, that compromise would be mostly cosmetic.

A solid requirement that a BBA be passed before a second increase in the debt ceiling is likely a non-starter for a whole host of reasons. But demanding a vote on the BBA before a second debt-ceiling hike might be an appeasing gesture.

Negotiators might also find it helpful to demand concessions on issues beyond the budget in order to provide cover to various Republicans. Senate pledges to change Obamacare or light bulb bans or other conservative bette noires might help keep the support of House Republicans. Procedurally, some of those moves could be hard to execute, but they might provide a helpful avenue.

If Republicans want to reinforce the chances that an ultimate debt-ceiling reconciliation will pass, Senate Republicans might be wise to put forward a measure that gets more than the 7 or so Republican votes that would be needed to override a filibuster. A bill that comes out of the Senate as a RINO bill will have a harder time getting through the House (assuming any Senate-approved bill can avoid that stamp). Some Democratic defections in the Senate would likely make it easier for any compromise to be passed; it would increase the perception that the bill was "tough."

Update: The Hill has some specifics on one line of compromise: a two-step borrowing from the McConnell plan.

McConnell: GOP Showed Restraint in '95

Mitch McConnell has an op-ed in tomorrow's Washington Post bringing up a few facts about filibuster "reform." The first is that the Senate GOP decided to keep the filibuster even when it gained power in January 1995:

Just two months after securing a congressional majority for the first time in 40 years, Republicans strode into the Senate chamber on Jan. 5, 1995, to cast the first vote of the 104th Congress - a vote to limit their own power.

Sen. Tom Harkin had proposed changing Senate rules so that it would take only 51 votes to shut down debate instead of the traditional 60. Though it was clearly in the Republican majority's short-term interest to support the measure, every one of us voted against it, as did then-Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. and senior members of the Democratic leadership in the Senate, including the majority leader and the president pro tempore.

The second is that Reid has done certain things to shut Republicans out of the process in the Senate:

What these critics [of the filibuster] routinely fail to mention (and too many reporters fail to report) is the precipitating action: the Democratic majority's repeated use of a once-rare procedural gimmick that has kept Republicans from amending bills that are brought to the floor. This practice, known as "filling the amendment tree," leads to a question that answers itself: Why would Republicans vote for action on a bill that, we've been promised, we'll be blocked from contributing to in any way? If the majority wants more cooperation, it could start by allowing differing views to be heard.

Over the past four years, Democrats have used such gimmicks to pursue their most prized legislative goals while attempting to minimize the number of uncomfortable votes they've had to take. My Democratic counterpart in the Senate, Harry Reid, has played quarterback, setting records for the number of times he has blocked Republicans from having any input on bills, cut off our right to debate and bypassed the committee process in order to write bills behind closed doors.