The sudden surge of populist
presidential candidates has occasioned a renewed debate on the right about the
relationship between populism and conservatism.
Some pundits seem to take for granted that populism is essentially
antithetical to conservatism. It’s true
that particular populist efforts certainly can run afoul of limited-government
principles. With its government control of income, the “Share Our Wealth”
program of Huey Long, for instance, radically breaks with the principles of the
free market and limited government.
However, a bit of political
imagination can suggest potentially a partial harmony between populist
principles and conservative ones. Conservatives have at least three reasons for
taking the current populist insurgency, which goes far beyond Donald Trump,
seriously. As a matter of principle, thinking about how to respond to these
populist energies can reinvigorate conservatism as a political approach by
forcing it to think more creatively about how to respond to concrete political
circumstances. As a matter of political calculation, harnessing these populist
energies could help conservatives secure a stronger national governing
coalition. As a matter of political circumspection, conservatives might be
right to fear that, if the forces driving the populist insurgency are not
addressed by any coalition, the popular anger might grow more and more intense
and thereby make the ultimate populist reckoning a nuclear meltdown.
What follows below is a—perhaps
overly optimistic—survey of potential theoretical areas for a conservative and
populist detente.
Diffusion of power:
One of the central motifs of populism is the idea of returning “power to the
people.” The diffusion of power is certainly an idea that conservatives can get
behind. After all, the tenets of localism to which many conservatives subscribe
emphasize decentralizing power in order to get it back into the hands of local
communities rather than federal bureaucrats. Where populists often go wrong is
in hoping that this return of power can take place through a virtuous despot or
through some centralized bureaucracy. Once power is concentrated in the hands
of a supreme leader, it rarely leaves his living grasp, and massive
bureaucracies can often be manipulated to reward those in power rather than the
people that they were originally intended to help.
Conservatives can channel this
popular energy for diffuse empowerment into an emphasis on strengthening local
government and kicking off a broad-based prosperity. They might stress tax reform
that prioritizes working families and regulatory reform that ensure that
government regulations are less cumbersome and less in thrall to special
interests.
The national: Populism
in general is often derided as a “nationalist” movement. Interestingly, some on
the left and the right accuse both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump of
subscribing to a retrograde nationalism.
Trump’s rhetoric in particular is often aggressively nationalistic. At
times, he portrays the world economy as a competition between nations, with
clear “winners” and “losers” (and these days he often portrays the U.S.
as a “loser” betrayed by its feckless elites).
Conservatives should not cheer a
braggadocious jingoism, but they should also recognize that plenty of sober
people within the American tradition (from Alexander Hamilton to Henry Clay to
George Shultz) believed that nations do have interests and that American
statesmen should advance those interests. Advancing those interests doesn’t
necessarily mean that we have to enter a war of all against all, just like the
practice of companies advancing their interests in the free market doesn’t
necessarily lead to economic devastation.
Calls to strengthen the United States
as a nation should not necessarily be seen as a dead-end tribalism; throughout
history, the cause of liberty has often been assisted by the strength of the
American republic (as the Civil War, World War II, and the Cold War
demonstrate). Like any other political
arrangement, the nation-state has its shortcomings. However, it is (so far)
perhaps one of the best ways we have of securing basic rights and liberties.
The idea of a republic demands having a limited body-politic with the power of
self-governance, so dissolving a republic in the name of transnational utopianism
would likely also mean the dissolution of self-government and the evisceration
of many of our civil rights.
Competence: Populists
are often associated with a kind of know-nothing insouciance to competence; the
fact that something is popular—it feels
right—overcomes all practical objections. Ironically, then, one of Donald
Trump’s biggest applause lines on the stump is his suggestion that current
governing elites are, as he puts it, “very, very stupid.” Many sympathetic to
the rising populist wave believe not just that our nation has been badly
governed but also that it has been ineptly managed.
Conservatives can and should take
a measured approach to the topic of competence. They should note that human
fallibility means that efforts to run the nation’s local affairs through Washington, DC
will often lead to increased misery. No technocratic savant can, alas, save us
from human limitations. But even if the federal government cannot do everything
well, it can do some things well (or at least can try to do some things well). What the government can do within
appropriate Constitutional bounds, it should try to do efficiently and justly.
A competence reconciled with a recognition of the limits of central planning
can lead to gains for limited government and human happiness. Conversely, a
government that proves too inept at fulfilling its responsibilities can result
in calls for an even bigger and more intrusive government; the financial crisis
of 2008, for instance, was central for the expansion of government power during
the first two years of the Obama administration.
Integration: A common
accusation against populists is that they are xenophobic troglodytes, who blame
“the Other” for tainting an otherwise pure society. Xenophobia is an ugly
trait, and sensible conservatives would be wise to oppose it. But some of what
motivates populists is not xenophobia but the desire for a sense of common
fellowship in a nation. When that desire for social integration crosses the
line into demonizing groups of people, it of course loses its moral force.
But a more benign, non-xenophobic
desire for fellowship and integration can unite both conservatives and
populists. As political scientist Robert D. Putnam has argued, balkanization
and the breakdown of social trust come with numerous costs, including
alienation from the political process, diminished interest in private
cooperative endeavors, and increased personal isolation. These costs should
obviously concern defenders of limited government. Where there is a vacuum of
civil society, the Leviathan gains new opportunities for expansion. Now, the
sense of common fellowship is not the same thing as national homogeneity. One
of the great enterprises of e
pluribus unum is the simultaneous courting of individual uniqueness
and a reconciliation of these countless different individuals into a singular
republic.
Our current elites’ embrace of
identity politics and the new intolerance has taken a flamethrower to the
organic bonds of social trust. By pushing back against shame politics and
defending social tolerance and free expression, conservatives can help promote
a common but diverse public square. They could also help by rigorously
challenging the slice-and-dice identity politics that is foundational for so
much contemporary public discord. But these efforts to promote integration need
not be confined to the social. Efforts to promote the middle class and economic
opportunity also have a role to play.
Other areas where populists and
conservatives could ally include support for economic growth, a vigorous and
responsible foreign policy, and a respect for law and order. We have now experienced an economic
stagnation that has gone on for over a decade. This stagnation not only
inflames populist anxieties, but it also weakens the ability of the United States
to influence international affairs and worsens government finances. Populist anger at elite mismanagement applies
to foreign affairs, where the U.S.
has too often lurched from debacle to debacle.
A more effective foreign policy could ward off the risk of isolationism
as well as advance American interests and the cause of expanding liberty and
justice. Americans increasingly fear the
politicization of the justice system, which in turn damages their faith in the
foundational laws of the country. The
fact that the present administration has played so cavalierly with
Constitutional norms no doubt exacerbates this anxiety. Defending, and reforming when necessary, the
institutions of law and order could speak to enduring conservative principles
and a popular worry about the loss of stability.
Joining conservative and populist
sentiments is hardly novel. Calvin Coolidge’s 1924 Labor Day address, “The High
Place of Labor,” reveals the potential for joining populism and conservatism.
Throughout this speech, Coolidge emphasized the dignity of labor. He did not
argue for an opening of the national borders in order to correct a supposed
“skills shortage.” Instead of “men hunting for jobs,” he called for “jobs
hunting for men.” A tight labor market, Coolidge argued, would lead to national
prosperity as well as enrich the middle class. He did not view workers’ wages
as a negative on a corporate balance sheet but as a source of national growth.
Silent Cal, perhaps one of our
least demagogic presidents, offered a conception of government that could align
with both populist and conservative worldviews. A similar point could be made
about William F. Buckley, who had a conflicted relationship to populism but who
also shared many of its disruptive impulses, Ronald Reagan, and others. While
there are tensions between certain populist policy proposals and certain
conservative ones, the two political approaches can also find possible
alliances.
At the outset of his speech,
Coolidge addressed what he took to be a central problem, one that both
populists and conservatives might agree upon:
To my
mind America
has but one main problem, the character of the men and women it shall produce.
It is not fundamentally a Government problem, although the Government can be of
a great influence in its solution. It is the real problem of the people
themselves. They control its property, they have determined its government,
they manage its business. In all things they are the masters of their own
destiny. What they are, their intelligence, their fidelity, their courage,
their faith, will determine our material prosperity, our successes and
happiness at home, and our place in the world abroad.
If anything is to be done then, by the Government, for the people who toil, for
the cause of labor, which is the sum of all other causes, it will be by
continuing its efforts to provide healthful surroundings, education, reasonable
conditions of employment, fair wages for fair work, stable business prosperity,
and the encouragement of religious worship.
Coolidge did not offer the state
as the magical solver of all problems. Indeed, he did not believe that the
state could be a perfect substitute for the richer textures of civil society.
But he did think that the state could help advance the interests of civil
society through its efforts at public safety, education, a vibrant economy, and
a defense of religious freedom.
The health of a republican
government ultimately depends upon the principles to which it subscribes and to
the conditions of the people who constitute that government. An economic
recovery that reignites growth and opportunity for the middle class combined
with a reinforcement of civil society could go a long way toward improving
those conditions. Much of what drives the current populist insurgency is very
likely the desire for renewed economic energy and a reinvigorated faith in the
strength of the foundations of the American republic. We can deliver on both of
those things in a way that is in essential accord with the principles of
limited government.
